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ABSTRACT
We develop an economic framework for valuing improvements to health and life expectancy, based
on individuals' willingness to pay. We then apply the framework to past and prospective reductions
in mortality risks, both overall and for specific life-threatening diseases. We calculate (i) the social
values of increased longevity for men and women over the 20th century; (ii) the social value of
progress against various diseases after 1970; and (iii) the social value of potential future progress
against various major categories of disease. The historical gains from increased longevity have been
enormous. Over the 20th century, cumulative gains in life expectancy were worth over $1.2 million
per person for both men and women. Between 1970 and 2000 increased longevity added about $3.2
trillion per year to national wealth, an uncounted value equal to about half of average annual GDP
over the period. Reduced mortality from heart disease alone has increased the value of life by about
$1.5 trillion per year since 1970. The potential gains from future innovations in health care are also
extremely large. Even a modest 1 percent reduction in cancer mortality would be worth nearly $500
billion.
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I.  Introduction 
  During the 20
th century, life expectancy at birth for a representative American increased by 
roughly 30 years.  In 1900, nearly 18 percent of males born in the United States died before their 
first birthday – today, it isn’t until age 62 that cumulative mortality reaches 18 percent.
1  As we 
demonstrate below, this remarkable increase in longevity reflects progress against a variety of 
afflictions and diseases, driving reductions in mortality at all ages.  It illustrates a substantial, but 
unmeasured, increase in social welfare due to improvements in health.  
This paper develops and applies an economic framework for valuing improvements in 
health and longevity, based on individuals’ willingness to pay.  We use our framework to estimate 
the economic gains from declining mortality in the United States over the 20
th century, and to 
value the prospective gains that could be obtained from further progress against major diseases.  
We find that these values are enormous.  Gains in life expectancy over the century were worth 
over $1.2 million per person to the current population.  From 1970 to 2000 gains in life 
expectancy added about $3.2 trillion per year to national wealth, with half of these gains due to 
progress against heart disease alone.  Looking ahead, we estimate that even modest progress 
against major diseases would be extremely valuable.  For example, a permanent 1 percent 
reduction in mortality from cancer has a present value to current and future generations of 
Americans of nearly $500 billion, while a cure (if one is feasible) would be worth about $50 
trillion. 
                                                            
1 Death rates by age are recorded in Vital Statistics of the United States.  Other developed countries show similar 
progress over the century.   Longer term data are scant, but suggest that progress accelerated up until about 1950.  For 
example, Swedish data since 1751 show an increase in life expectancy of  6 years between 1800 and 1850, 9 years 
between 1850 and 1900, 17 years between 1900 and 1950, and 9 years between 1950 and 2000 (Statistics Sweden, 
Program for Population Statistics).    2 
Our analysis of the values of health improvements is founded on individuals’ 
maximization of lifetime expected utility.  We distinguish two types of health improvements – 
those that extend life by reducing mortality, and those that raise the quality of life.  Life extension 
is valued because utility from goods and leisure accrues over a longer period, and improvements in 
the quality of life raise utility from given amounts of goods and leisure.  This framework delivers 
precise expressions for the economic value of a life-year, for the value of remaining life, and for 
changes in these values when health improves.  We show that the social value of improvements in 
health is greater: (a) the larger is the population, (b) the higher are average lifetime incomes, (c) 
the greater is the existing level of health, and (d) the closer are the ages of the population to the 
age of onset of disease.  These factors point to an increasing valuation of health improvements 
over the past several decades and into the future.  As the U.S. population grows, as lifetime 
incomes grow, as health levels improve and as the baby-boom generation approaches the primary 
ages of disease-related death, the social value of improvements in health will continue to rise.   
We also show that improvements in health tend to be complementary; for example, 
improvements in life expectancy (from any source) raise willingness to pay for further health 
improvements by increasing the value of remaining life.  This means that advances against one 
disease, say heart disease, raise the value of progress against other age-related ailments such as 
cancer or Alzheimer’s.  This is of significant empirical relevance, as it implies that the well-
documented historical progress against heart disease, for which mortality has fallen by roughly 30 
percent since 1970, has increased the value of further progress against other afflictions.  We find 
that reductions in mortality since 1970 have raised the value of further health progress by about 18 
percent.    3 
  An analysis of the social value of improvements in health is a first step toward evaluating 
the social returns to medical research and health-augmenting innovations.  Improvements in health 
and longevity are partially determined by society’s stock of medical knowledge, for which basic 
medical research is a key input.  The U.S. invests over $50 billion annually in medical research, of 
which about 40 percent is federally funded, accounting for 25 percent of government research and 
development outlays.
2  The $27 billion federal expenditure for health related research in FY 2003, 
the vast majority of which is for the National Institutes of Health, represented a real dollar 
doubling over 1993 outlays. Are these expenditures warranted?  Our analysis suggests that the 
returns to basic research may be quite large, so that substantially greater expenditures may be 
worthwhile.  By way of example, take our estimate that a 1 percent reduction in cancer mortality 
would be worth about $500 billion.  Then a “war on cancer” that would spend an additional $100 
billion (over some period) on cancer research and treatment would be worthwhile if it has a 1-in-5 
chance of reducing mortality by 1 percent, and a 4-in-5 chance of doing nothing at all.      
  Against these potential benefits of improving health one must weigh the costs of 
implementing new medical technologies.  Our analysis highlights some of the important economic 
issues surrounding the valuation of improvements in health, health research and the growth in 
health expenditures.  Many of these issues have significant policy implications.  For example, the 
annuitization of many public and private retirement benefits (Social Security, private pensions, 
Medicare and private medical coverage) and the prevalence of third party payers increase 
incentives to spend on medical care, even when benefits are far smaller than costs.  These 
distortions also skew investments in research away from cost-decreasing improvements in 
                                                            
2 The distribution of health R&D expenditure is reported by the National Institutes of Health.  See 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/pubs/pubd/hus/tables/2001/01hus126.pdf.  Pharmaceutical industry R&D 
expenditures are reported in www.phrma.org/publications/publications/profile02/chapter2.pdf.  Government   4 
technology, as the demand for care is artificially price insensitive.  This creates “second-best” 
considerations in valuing medical advances: innovations that would otherwise be welfare 
improving may be socially wasteful because ex-post utilization decisions are distorted.  In the 
presence of such distortions, we must take account of the induced effect that medical advances 
have on expenditures when evaluating the social returns to improvements in technology.  Our 
methodology does this, and we provide evidence on the value of improving health relative to 
increased health care expenditures.  Overall, the value of increased longevity has greatly exceeded 
the costs of health care, though for some cases we find negative net social values.  
  The paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides some empirical foundation for the 
analysis that follows, documenting the increase in longevity, and its sources, that occurred has 
occurred in the U.S.  Section III develops our economic model for valuing improvements in health 
and life expectancy, and Sections IV calibrates willingness to pay for health improvements. 
Sections V and VI present the empirical application of our methods, estimating the economic 
gains associated with the improvements in life expectancy over the 20
th century, with particular 
focus on the post-1970 period.  We also estimate the potential gains to future progress against 
major categories of disease, and we provide a rough estimate of the value of improvements in the 
health-related “quality” of life.  Section VII concludes. 
II.  The Setting: Long-Term Evidence of Improvements in Health 
Figure 1 shows life expectancy at birth and age 50 in the United States since 1900.   These and 
other estimates that follow are based on cross sectional age-specific death rates at each date, so 
(when health is improving) they will underestimate life expectancy for a given birth cohort.  The 
figure shows that life expectancy over the century increased by slightly over 30 years.  Progress 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
expenditures for health R&D are reported by the National Science Foundation; see 
www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/nsf02330/historic.htm.   5 
during the first half of the century was rapid and evidently concentrated at younger ages – life 
expectancy conditional on reaching age 50 grew only slightly.  In 1900, about 18 percent of males 
died before their first birthday.  By 1950 it took 52 years for cumulative male mortality to reach 
18 percent, and with current mortality rates it would take 62 years.  Progress slowed between 1950 
and 1970, especially for men, but the upward trend in life expectancy began again after 1970.  
Late century gains were especially prominent for older individuals—expected remaining life of 50 
year old men has increased by 5 years since 1970. 
Tables 1 and 2 provide further insight into the reasons for these trends.  Table 1 uses age 
specific mortality data to decompose inter-decade changes in longevity into contributions from 
various age intervals.  The estimates show the additional life years contributed by declining 
mortality rates in each age interval and decade; for example, between 1910 and 1920 lower male 
infant mortality (<1 year old) contributed 2.48 of the 4.85 expected life-years gained over the 
decade.  The table demonstrates important age and gender differences in the timing of life-
extending improvements in health.  Over the century reductions in infant (<1) and child (1-14) 
mortality were the major contributing factors to increasing lifespans, yet almost all (85%) of these 
gains occurred before 1950. This partially explains the slowdown in overall growth that occurred 
from 1950 to 1970.  In contrast, the renewal of growth that occurred after 1970 is largely 
accounted for by declining mortality among older Americans.  For example, the contribution of 
reduced mortality among men aged 55 and over was negligible before 1970, but since then 
declining death rates of older men have added 3.9 years to expected lifetimes.  This is more than 
half of the total male gain over that period.  Women’s gains at older ages began earlier, in the 
1940’s, but slowed relative to men’s gains after 1980.
3 
                                                            
3 Evidence for other developed countries roughly conforms to the data in Figure 1 and Tables 1 and 2.  For OECD 
countries as a whole, from 1960 to 2000 the average at-birth life expectancy of women increased by 9 years and that   6 
This shift in the age distribution of rising longevity reflects differential progress against life-
threatening ailments, shown in Table 2.  The importance of declining mortality from afflictions 
that strike older individuals is clear.  Since 1950 the largest single contributor is reduced mortality 
from heart disease, which added more than 3.5 years to the expected lifetimes of both men and 
women, accounting for more than 40 percent of the total.  When combined with strokes, progress 
against cardiovascular diseases added 4.7 and 5.1 years to the expected lifetimes of men and 
women, with most of the gain occurring after 1970.
4     
  These data are the foundation for the problem we study. Rising longevity, and health 
improvements more generally, are a form of economic progress.  Valuation of these gains is 
important for two reasons.  First, traditional measures of economic growth and welfare, based on 
national income accounts, make no attempt to account for this source of rising living standards.  
They therefore underestimate improvements in well-being.  Second, public expenditure accounts 
for a large portion of both medical research and the provision of medical care.  Efficient decisions 
require a framework for measuring the value of treatment, and of research-based medical progress.  
III.  Economic Framework: Valuing Improvements in Health 
Advances in health-related knowledge and its application can take many forms, ranging 
from the development of new medicines and techniques for treating disease to improvements in 
public health infrastructure.  These advances affect the quality of life and the risks of mortality at 
various stages of the lifecycle.  We assume that these effects are channeled through the intangible 
“health” of individuals, of which we distinguish two types.  The first, H(t), raises the quality of life 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
of men by 8 years. OECD Health Data, Table 1, Life Expectancy in Years, 
http://www.oecd.org/xls/M00031000/M00031357.xls. 
4 These tabulations indicate little progress against cancer.  This is partly an artifact of the way the underlying data are 
aggregated.  Closer examination (we do not provide the details here) shows declining cancer mortality at younger ages 
and rising mortality at older ones, with the overall age-adjusted rate fairly constant.  This may reflect selection: those 
who would have died from heart disease at younger ages may also be more prone to die from cancer later in life.    7 
without affecting mortality.  For example, new medicines that improve mental health, cure 
migraine headaches, or reduce the effects of arthritis will increase instantaneous utility without 
necessarily affecting the length of life.  The other, G(t), affects mortality without affecting the 
quality of life.  New methods of detecting treatable diseases or advances in surgical techniques are 
examples.  Of course, many advances in medical knowledge affect both types of health.  New 
medicines that reduce blood pressure or retard the advance of cancer can raise both the quality of 
life and its duration.  H(t) and G(t) are affected by the state of health technologies and also by 
individuals’ choices, but we relegate these choices to the background. 
How much are people willing to pay for improvements in health?  We build on the 
lifecycle analyses of Arthur (1981) and Rosen (1988, 1994) by assuming that willingness to pay is 
determined by the expected discounted present value of lifetime utility.
5  Write remaining lifetime 
expected utility for a representative individual of age a as  
(1)                                     
( ) ( ) ( ( ), ( )) ( , )
t a
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where  r  is the rate of time preference.  We adopt the normalization that the utility of death is 
zero.  Notice in (1) that H(t) enters multiplicatively, so improvements in type-H health enhance the 
“quality” of life by increasing instantaneous utility from consumption, c(t), and non-market time, 
l(t).
6  Type-G health enters (1) through the survivor function: 
(2)                                       ( , ) exp[ ( , ( )) ]
t
a
S t a G d l t t t = -￿
￿  
                                                            
5 Arthur (1981) and Rosen (1988, 1994) analyze the value of changes in longevity derived from lifetime expected 
utility.  They ignore quality of life (our H), the value of non-market time, and variation in the value of a life-year over 
the lifecycle.  Our equation (11), below, incorporates estimates of the value of non-market time and the value of 
improvements to health while living in assessing the value of health improvements. 
6 This specification for H is consistent with empirical methods for evaluating the quality of life for individuals with 
various ailments.  The most popular method asks individuals to index their current quality of a life-year against what   8 
In (2),  ( , ( )) G l t t  is the instantaneous mortality rate (hazard function) and  ( , ) S t a ￿   is the 
probability that the agent survives from age a to age t.  We assume that  0 G G
l l ¶ º < ¶  so that an 
increase in type-G health reduces mortality and increases the survivor function. 
  Notice from (2) that any factor that affects the instantaneous hazard of death, l, affects the 
survivor function in proportion to the survivor function itself.  Formally, for any factor a  that 
shifts the hazard at particular ages the impact on  ( , ) S t a ￿  is 
(3)                          
( , )
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A given change in the hazard at some age prior to t has a larger impact on the probability  ( , ) S t a ￿  
when  ( , ) S t a ￿ is itself large.  We return to the implications of this point later. 
  To close the lifecycle problem we must specify a budget constraint.  We assume a perfect 
annuity market, which means that at each age a, the lifetime expected discounted value of future 
consumption must equal expected lifetime wealth  
(4)                                    
( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( , ) 0
r t a
a
A a y t c t S t a e dt
¥
- - + - = ￿
￿  
where r is the interest rate, A(a) is initial assets at age a, and y(t) is life-contingent income at age 
t.
7  Equation (4) is the lifecycle equivalent of a complete market for consumption insurance.  With 
endogenous labor supply, y(t) is determined by the choice of l(t),  ( ) ( )[1 ( )] ( ) y t w t l t b t = - + , where 
we normalize the maximum amount of non-market time at unity and b(t) is life-contingent non-
wage income such as social security or defined-benefit pension receipts. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
they would achieve if they were in “perfect” health.  The resulting “Quality Adjusted Life Years” (QALY) gives 
values of H£1, where H=1 indexes perfect health. 
7 Later we briefly consider the polar opposite case of zero saving and borrowing, so that c(t)=y(t) for all t.     9 
The individual chooses c(t) and l(t) to maximize (1) subject to (4) 
(5)                   
( ) ( ) ( ) { ( ) ( ( ), ( )) [ ( ) ( )] } ( , ) ( )
t a r t a
a
U a H t u c t l t e y t c t e S t a dt A a
r m m
¥
- - - - = + - + ￿
￿  
wherem  is the multiplier associated with constraint (4).
8  Optimization yields the familiar 
necessary conditions 
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Notice that H(t) and consumption of other goods are natural complements in our setup.  For 
example, if type-H health declines at older ages (6) implies that consumption will decline as well.
9 
This is consistent with empirical studies of lifecycle consumption, and we exploit this feature 
below in calibrating the value of a life-year.   
Equation (5) is our basic building block for thinking about factors that provide value by 
improving health.  Before turning to those issues, notice that (5) and (6) provide a dollar figure for 
the “value of a life.”  Consider a small change  ( ) d a l  in the instantaneous hazard of death at age 
a.  Using the properties of the survivor function in (2),  ( ) 0 d a l <  increases survivorship in all 
future periods of life.  The effect on expected lifetime utility is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { ( ) ( ( ), ( )) [ ( ) ( )] } ( )
t a r t a
a
dU a d a H t u c t l t e y t c t e S t dt
r l m
¥
- - - - = - + - ￿
￿  
The value of remaining life at age a is the marginal rate of substitution between changes in 
( ) a l and assets, A(a): 
                                                            
8 We have simplified by ignoring personal medical expenditures, which might be treated as a non-consumption 
expense.  We return to a consideration of medical expenditures and the costs of health care in our empirical work. 
9 A sufficient condition for health and consumption to move together over the lifecycle is  ( , ) 0 cl u c l ³ -- leisure does 
not reduce the marginal utility of consumption.  If  cl u¢¢  sufficiently negative, then consumption can rise as health falls.   10 
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 plus net savings 
that accrue at age t.  Net savings at age t increase the value of a life-year because they are used to 
finance consumption in other periods, with marginal utilitym.  Notice that the personal rate of time 
preference, r , does not appear in (7): the ability to borrow and lend means that the expected value 
of a future life-year is discounted at the market rate of interest, r.  As both interest and mortality 
cause future life-years to be discounted, we define 
( ) ( , ) ( , )
r t a S t a e S t a
- - º ￿  as the “discounted 
survivor function.” 
Similarly H(t) does not appear explicitly in the value of life formula (7).  For example, 
think of two individuals, A and B, with identical mortality and wealth, but where person A has 
uniformly greater H(t).  Then (7) indicates that the monetary value of a life will be the same for A 
and B because type-H health raises total utility and the marginal utility of consumption by the 
same proportional amount.  Put differently, the marginal rate of substitution between “life” (or the 
probability of living) and consumption does not depend on health.
10  This does not mean that 
                                                            
10 Think of a utility function for three goods: (1) health, H, (2) the probability of surviving a given period of time, S; 
and (3) consumption, c.  If utility is of the form v(H)u(S,c) then the marginal rate of substitution between S and c does 
not depend on H.  Nevertheless, H is valuable, with marginal value v’(H)/uc(S,c).   11 
health has no value, however; it simply says that willingness to pay for changes in survival do not 
depend on the level of health.  This property is consistent with empirical evidence, as summarized 
by the Environmental Protection Agency’s Science Advisory Board (2000): 
There are no published studies that show that persons with physical limitations or chronic 
illnesses are willing to pay less to increase their longevity than persons without those 
limitations.  People with physical limitations appear to adjust to their conditions, and their 
willingness to pay to reduce fatal risks is therefore not affected.
11 
 
Life-Cycle Changes in the Value of Life 
While differences in type-H health between individuals do not generate corresponding 
differences in the value of life, age-related changes in type-H health and income affect the age 
profile of the value of a life-year.   Adopting the notation  log ( )/ x d x t dt
·
º , differentiation of (8) 
yields the rate of change in the value of a life-year as an individual ages: 
(9)           
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( ) 1 ( )
( ) ( )
w w
y t y t c t
v t s t w t s t b t H t r
v t v t
r
· · · · ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = + - + - + - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 
where sw is the share of labor earnings in total life-contingent income.  The first term in (9) ties the 
age profile of v(t) to changes in income.  Pre-retirement we can set sw=1, so the value of a life-year 
tracks the age profile of wages.  Indexing of post-retirement annuity incomes suggests b
·
=0 is a 
good approximation for retired persons.  The second term ties life-cycle changes in v(t) to changes 
in health and to time preference.   Complementarity between type-H health and consumption of 
goods and leisure in (6) causes the value of a life-year to fall as health declines ( 0 H
·
< ) at older 
ages, so persons with declining health are, in effect, more impatient.  In our later empirical work 
we calibrate a lifecycle pattern of H
·
based on lifecycle patterns of consumption.   
                                                            
11 http://www.epa.gov/sab/pdf/eeacf013.pdf    12 
Cost-benefit evaluations that apply employ empirical estimates of the “value of a 
statistical” life (VSL), and the empirical studies on which they are founded, typically assume that 
VSLs do not depend on age.  Then it is just as valuable to “save” a 60 year old as a 40 year old.  
Our framework indicates that the value of remaining life is age dependent, first rising and then 
falling as a person ages.  From (7) the value of remaining life satisfies the usual law of motion for 
an asset price: 
                                         
( )
( ( )) ( ) ( )
V a








Letting R(a) represent the (discounted) length of remaining life at age a, this becomes  
(10)                     [ ]
( ) ( )
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= + - +
¶ ¶ ￿  
Life tables for the United States and other developed economies indicate that the last term is 
negative at all ages—surviving another year reduces the length of remaining life—though it is 
conceivably positive in situations where the young are at particularly high risk of death, say due to 
childhood disease or violence.  The first term is positive (negative) if the future is “better” (worse), 
on average, than the present.  From (9), this term will be positive at younger ages because wages 
typically rise with age and because type-H health is unlikely to deteriorate much among the young.  
Later in life, when wage growth is negligible,  ( ) V a l  must decline as persons age because type-H 
health deteriorates ( ( ) ( ) v t v a <  for t > a) and because the remaining length of life is falling.    
Willingness to Pay for Improvements in Health 
To see how this framework can be used to evaluate improvements in health, consider some 
factor,a , that can affect both the type-H and type-G concepts of health.  For purposes of 
subsequent discussion we will refer toa as the state of “medical knowledge”—techniques, 
medicines, and so on—though it can equally represent factors that improve public health, such as   13 
environmental improvements, improved nutrition or access to medical care.  The marginal value 
of some improvement in medical knowledge follows from the displacement of (5):   
(11)           ( ) ( ) ( ( ), ( ))
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( ) c a a
U a H t u c t l t
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Equation (11) measures the change in value of life induced by changes in any factor that affects 
type-H or type-G health.  The first term in (11) is the dollar value of the gain in lifetime expected 
utility from changes in mortality, indexed by changes in the survivor 
function
( , )
( , ) ( , )
S t a




.   These changes in the probability of survival weight the value 
of a life-year in each period where mortality changes.    
The second term is the value of changes in type-H health at each age,  ( ) ( )/ H t H t a a ¢ º ¶ ¶ , 
that raise quality of life while holding mortality fixed.   These improvements weight utility itself, 
with no contribution from net savings.  Notice that when savings are negligible, proportional 
changes in type-H health ( / H H a ¢ ) and in the survivor function ( a G ) are valued in exactly the 
same way.  Living a bit better is like living a bit longer.  
Equation (11) is the foundation for our efforts to value past and prospective changes in 
longevity and the quality of life. To make empirical headway we restrict utility to be homothetic, 
so  ( , ) ( ( , )) u c l u z c l º where z is homogeneous of degree one.  Then the dollar value of a life-year is 
(suppressing time arguments) 
(12)                                     
( ) ( , )
( , ) ( )
c l
c c
u z c z l u c l
v y c y c
u c l z u z
+
= + - = + -
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so z is a composite commodity that aggregates consumption and non-market time.  Define full 
consumption and full income by adding the shadow value of non-market time to consumption and 
income:   14 
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= = , the market wage.    Then  
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or 
(13)                                                    ( )
F F v y c z = + F  
In (13),  ( ) z F is consumer surplus per unit of the composite commodity z, which is identical to 
surplus per dollar of full consumption.  It is positive when average utility of z is greater than 
marginal utility, or equivalently when the elasticity of utility with respect to z is smaller than 1.0.  
The theory does not imply that  ( ) z F ³ 0, however.  Positive utility may require composite 
consumption above some minimum subsistence level, 0 z , where  0 ( ) 0 u z = .  Then  0 ( ) 1 z F = -  and, 
by monotonicity of surplus, there is a  1 0 z z > where  1 ( ) 0 z F = .
12 
Equation (13) demonstrates two important points about the value of a life-year.  First, even 
if  ( ) 0 z F =  the value of being alive exceeds measured income because of the value of non-market 
time.  This is especially important for persons without wage and salary income—such as the 
retired—for whom the value of non-market time accounts for most of
F y .  For full-time workers 
non-working hours are valued at w and annual hours of leisure are (reasonably) greater than hours 
worked, so that 
F y  may be more than double money income.  Second, full consumption adds to 
                                                            
12 Note that v(t)<0 doesn’t mean that death is preferred, as the value of continued life at a is determined by 
( ) V a l which will be positive if future prospects are brighter.   15 
this value so long as ( ) 0 z F > .  For example, if  ( ) 1 z F =  (surplus equals consumption expenditure) 
and y=c (no savings), then the value of a life year would be more than 4 times annual income.  For 
a typical male at peak lifecycle earnings—roughly $45,000 per year around age 50—this would 
put the value of a life year above $180,000.  The evidence we develop below suggests it is larger 
still. 
Now use (13) to rewrite (7) and (11):  
(14)       ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ( ( ))] ( , )
F F
a
V a y t c t z t S t a dt l
¥
= + F ￿  
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Equation (14) is the value of an age-a statistical life, which is the expected discounted value of full 
income and surplus on full consumption.  Equation (15) is the age-a willingness to pay for 
improvements in health.   Both are proportional to full income and consumption, implying that 











 denote the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) in consumption, and consider the impact of increased 
income or wealth on v(t).  Abstracting from saving by setting y=c, the income elasticity of v(t) is 
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.   Evidence developed below indicates  ( ) z F »2 for 
prime-aged individuals, and empirical estimates of the EIS suggests  ( ) 1.0 z s =  as a rough upper 
bound, so the condition is likely satisfied—with these values the income elasticity of the value of a   16 
life year is 1.33.  It would be larger still for values of  ( ) 1.0 z s < , as are common found in 
empirical applications.
13   
Equations (14)-(16) have a number of implications for valuing improvements in health and 
health-related investments.   
1.  Willingness to pay for improvements in health is proportional to full income and full 
consumption, so willingness to pay rises with wealth.  That wealthier individuals are willing to 
pay more for improvements in health may seem obvious, but the broader implication is that 
economic growth is a boon to health-related investments.  This is especially important when 
willingness to pay for health improvements is income elastic, as suggested by (16).  Then 
richer societies invest proportionally more in health because life itself is more valuable.
14 
2.  The relevant concepts of income and consumption include the shadow value of non-market 
time.  Common attempts to value life-years based on income or consumption expenditures 
alone will miss a large part of what people value, especially when health improvements are 
concentrated at older ages.
15 
3.  Wealth constant, improvements in both type-G and type-H health are more valuable when 
surplus per dollar of full consumption,F, is large.   Intuitively,F is large when the demand 
for current consumption is inelastic, so that consumption expenditures at different ages are 
poor substitutes— ( ) z s is small.  Then loss of a year of life cannot be offset by simply 
reallocating consumption to other years.  We exploit this notion in the next section, gauging 
F from evidence on intertemporal substitution in consumption. 
4.  For given profiles of income and consumption, the value of a reduction in mortality ( a G ) or an 
improvement in the quality of life ( / H H a ¢ ) is larger when  ( , ) S t a is large.  This suggests a 
form of increasing returns in health improvements: medical and other advances that reduce 
mortality raise the value of further advances, because individuals are more likely to be alive to 
enjoy the benefits.  So health-related investments will be more valuable to already healthy 
                                                            
13 Section IV discusses empirical evidence on  ( ) z s . 
14 Our estimates of the value of a life year are based on empirical estimates of the value of a statistical life (VSL), as 
surveyed in Viscusi (1992) and Viscusi and Aldy (2003).  Based on comparisons of VSLs across countries Viscusi 
and Aldy conclude that the income elasticity of the value of a statistical life is about 0.6.  
15 For example, the Conference Board of Canada’s (2001) estimates the “costs” of excess mortality based on what a 
decedent would have produced, not the value to the individual of remaining alive.   17 
individuals, and in societies where average health is already high.  We develop this point more 
completely in Section V.   
5.  The value of progress against a particular disease is greatest when the current age, a, is close 
to, but before, the typical age of onset of the disease.  For example, for an ailment like 
cardiovascular disease, mortality-reducing progress ( a G ) is likely to be concentrated at ages 
50 and above.  Then the expected present value of such progress will be greater at age 45 than 
at ages 25 or 90 because of both discounting and survivorship.   Thus we estimate in Section 
VI that a 10% reduction in mortality from heart disease would be worth about $30,000 to a 45-
year old male but only about $15,000 to men aged 25 or 90.  Similarly, progress against 
Alzheimer’s that improves the quality of life ( / H H a ¢ >0) will be more valuable to 60 year-olds 
than to 30 year-olds.     
IV. Calibration: The Value of a Life-Year 
Our calibration strategy begins with estimates of “the value of a statistical life” taken from 
the literature on willingness to pay for reductions in risks of accidental death (see Viscusi (1992) 
for a survey or Thaler and Rosen (1975) for an original analysis).  These studies estimate 
willingness to pay from wage differences on jobs with varying probabilities of accidental death, or 
from market prices for products (such as airbags) that reduce the likelihood of a fatal injury.  For 
example, suppose that workers in a particular occupation require a $500 annual wage premium in 
order to accept a 1 in 10,000 increase in the annual probability of accidental death.  In a population 
of 10,000 workers this change in risk would raise expected deaths by 1 each year, with an 
aggregate value of $500 ´ 10,000 = $5 million.  Then the value of one statistical life is $5 million.  
In our framework this is the conceptual equivalent of the value of remaining life given by  ( ) V a l  in 
(14).   
According to Viscusi’s (1993) survey, this literature yields a “reasonable range” of values 
for  ( ) V a l  of $4 million to $9 million per statistical life, expressed in current (2004) dollars, while   18 
Viscusi and Aldy (2003) provide a tighter range for U.S. data at $5.5 to $7.5 million.  Government 
agencies and panels regularly update these estimates to account for economic growth, new 
methods, and evidence; for example since 1999 the Environmental Protection Agency used a value 
of $6.3 million per statistical life in its cost-benefit analyses.
16  These estimates are typically 
founded on regression analyses of risk-income tradeoffs for working-age individuals, so for the 
calculations that follow we will assume that the survivorship-weighted average value of a 
statistical life for individuals between the ages of 25 and 55 is $6.3 million.  Readers who prefer a 
different value may adjust things accordingly, as most of our later estimates are scalable.    
Given this average value in (14), it remains to impute a lifecycle shape for the value of a 
life-year, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ))
F F v t y t c t z t = + F , which in turn determines the lifecycle pattern of the value of 
a life (14) and willingness to pay for health improvements (15).  We construct v(t) from the 
model’s structure and empirical evidence on key parameters.  Values of full income  ( )
F y t  for a 
representative individual can be constructed from lifecycle wage profiles, while the time paths of 
( ) c t  and  ( )
F c t  satisfy  
(17a)                              ( ) ( ) L c r H s w s r s h s = - + - - ￿ ￿ ￿  
(17b)                              ( ) (1 )
F
L c r H s w s r s s = - + - - ￿ ￿ ￿  
where  L s  is the share of non-market time in full consumption and h is the elasticity of substitution 
between consumption and leisure in z(c,l).  We assume that s  and h are constants, which implies 
that z(c.l) is CES and that  
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16  See Dockins et. al. (2004) for a review.    19 
where  0 ( ) u z =0.  The value of a life-year will be larger when demand for current full consumption 
is more inelastic, which occurs when there is little intertemporal substitution in consumption. 
  There is a substantial empirical literature seeking to estimate s based on versions of (17a).  
Hansen and Singleton (1983), Hall (1988), and Campbell and Mankiw (1989) find that aggregate 
consumption growth is insensitive to changes in the real interest rate, so that s is close to zero.  
This would imply unreasonably large values of a life-year because  ( ) z F  would be huge.  
Similarly Barsky et. al. (1997), using questionnaire responses, find an upper bound on s of about 
0.36.  In contrast, Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) survey estimates of s  from micro-
data and conclude that the evidence favors a value for s that is “a bit” larger than 1.0.   We know 
of no formal evidence on an analogue of  0 / z z , though comparisons of living standards over time 
and across countries suggest that it is quite small.  In effect, the ratio asks how much composite 
consumption individuals would sacrifice before they would rather be dead.  Notice that this ratio 
must be sufficiently positive for values of  1 s <  to generate positive surplus in (18). 
  Table 3 shows values of a life-year for a 50 year-old male who earns annual wages and 
benefits of $60,000 for 2000 hours of work.
17  We assume that y=c for these calculations, which is 
reasonable at this point in the lifecycle,
18 and that full income and consumption are based on 4000 
hours available for work and leisure.  We calculate v(t) under various assumptions for the sizes of 
s  and  0 / z z .   The values in the table are large.  For example, for s =1.0 the value of an age-50 
life-year ranges from $193,000 ( ( ) z F =0.61) when  0 / z z =.2 up to $360,000 ( ( ) z F =2.0) when 
                                                            
17 Median annual earnings of men aged 45-54 who worked full time in 1999 were about $45,000, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/earnings/call1usmale.html.  Non-wage benefits average about 29% of total 
compensation for a typical worker, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.t01.htm.   
18 Consumer Expenditure Survey data indicate that households with a “reference person” aged 45-54 2002-2003 
reported average after tax incomes of $53,195 and consumption expenditures of $46,353.  
http://www.bls.gov/cex/home.htm, Table 29.   20 
0 / z z =.05.  For purposes of the following calculations we assume  .80 s =  at all ages and  0 / z z  = 
.10 at age 50, yielding a value of a life-year of $373,000 ( ( ) z F =2.11) when y=c.  
    To complete the lifecycle calibration of v(t) we choose the parameters of (17) in order to 
fit lifecycle patterns of consumption, and y(t) to match lifecycle wages.  We impute the shape of 
y(t) by estimating a standard human capital earnings function with a 4
th order polynomial in years 
of labor market experience.  Empirical studies of lifecycle consumption indicate that consumption 
expenditures peak around age 50 and then decline by about 2% per year thereafter.
19  This pattern 
is consistent with declining type-H health after middle-age, together with r r > , which we 
assume.  Figure 2a shows our imputed lifecycle patterns of v(t),  ( )
F y t and  ( )
F c t  that yield an 
average value of Vl =$6.3 million between ages 25 and 55.
20  The value of a life-year peaks at 
over $350,000 around age 50, but falls by more than half by age 80 because consumption (health) 
declines.  Figure 2b shows the implied shape of H(t) that is consistent with lifecycle 
consumption—type-H health is stable until age 40, but declines rapidly in late middle-age.   
The values of a life-year shown in Figure 2a are large in comparison to values that have 
been used in some related studies, but these magnitudes are necessary in order to match empirical 
estimates of the value of a statistical life.  Lichtenberg (2001) and Cutler et. al. (1998) apply a 
uniform value of $25,000 per life year saved in valuing gains from new drugs and advances 
against heart disease.  This value is less than income for a typical full-time worker, and almost 
                                                            
19 See Banks et. al. (1998) and Browning and Crossley (2001).  Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2004) track the 
lifecycle profile of consumption from age 20, using Consumer Expenditure Survey data.  Their relative consumption 
index peaks at about 1.3 at age 50 and declines by about 2 percent per year thereafter.  Using British data Banks et. al. 
(1998) find that consumption peaks at age 50, declines by 2 percent per year pre-retirement, and by about 1 percent 
per year post-retirement.  In our calibrations, relative consumption peaks at 1.29 at age 50, with a rate of decline of 2 
percent at age 60 and 1.5-2 percent thereafter. 
20 In addition to the assumptions stated in the text, we assume r r - =.02,h =.50 and equal present values of expected 
lifetime income and consumption from age 20 forward.  We also assume that post-retirement life-contingent income 
replaces 50 percent of pre-retirement earnings, commencing at age 65.  Further details are presented in Murphy and 
Topel (2005).   21 
certainly less than full income, so it appears inconsistent with both theory and the evidence 
mentioned above that puts the value of a statistical life in the $4-9 million range.
21  Other studies 
impute higher values.  Moore and Viscusi (1988) estimate the value of a life-year at $175,000, 
while Miller, Calhoun, and Arthur (1990) estimate a value of $120,000, based on a $2 million 
value of a statistical life.  None of these studies account for lifecycle changes in the value of a life-
year, as implied by theory.  
Figure 3 plots values of remaining life by age for men and women using values of v(t) 
from Figure 2a for both sexes.  In these and following calculations we value life-years from birth 
to age 20 at their age 20 values.  The curves differ because we apply gender-specific survivor 
functions, so imputed values of remaining life are higher for women because they live longer.  The 
role of discounting, due to both interest and future mortality in S(t,a), is apparent in the figure: the 
value of remaining life peaks at $7 million for persons in their early 30’s, but declines smoothly 
thereafter even though the value of a life-year continues to rise until age 50.  We estimate that the 
value of remaining life declines to $5 million at age 50 and to $2 million by age 70. 
V.  Further Results 
Complementarity in Willingness to Pay for Health Improvements   
  As noted above, willingness to pay for health improvements in is larger the greater is the 
likelihood that one will be around to enjoy them; that is, the larger are future values of S(t,a).  This 
suggests a form of complementarity in the willingness to pay for health advances.  An 
improvement in type-G health that reduces mortality from cardiovascular disease, for example, 
raises future values of S(t,a).  This increases the value of advances against other mortality-causing 
                                                            
21 The purpose of the calculation in Cutler et. al. (1998) was to show that the value of additional life years offset the 
medical cost of achieving them.  So a conservative value imputed to life-years gained simply reinforced their point 
that benefits offset costs.   22 
diseases such as cancer.  So there is a sort of increasing return inherent to medical progress: past 
success raises the value of new improvements in health.  This complementarity is also important at 
the level of individual investments in health.  A medical advance that raises future survival 
probabilities raises the return to individual investments in health such as diet and exercise that 
have their main benefit in the future. 
  To formalize these ideas, assume that there are only two diseases, call them A and B, that 
affect type-H or type-G health.  To keep things simple, assume that A (B) affects one of type-H or 
type-G health, but not both.  This means that an advance against A might reduce mortality but 
leave the “quality” of life, through H, unchanged.  Other possibilities are simple combinations of 
the formulas that follow. 
  Consider first the case where A and B each affect mortality only.  By the nature of 
competing risks we know ( ) ( ) ( )
A B t t t l l l = + , where  ( )
j t l  is the mortality hazard from disease j.  










Differentiation of (15) and some algebra yields  
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In (19) the functions  0 a G ³ and  0 b G ³  are derivatives of ln ( , ) S t a , defined in (3), and are non-
decreasing in t and strictly positive for some values of t.  This means that the first integral in (19) 
is strictly positive, reflecting the intuition stated above: Progress against heart disease (A) raises 
future values of S(t,a).  This makes progress against cancer (B) more valuable because the   23 
individual is more likely to be alive to enjoy the gains.  Progress against cancer isn’t worth much 
if you are sure to die of a heart attack first.   
  The second line of (19) is a wealth effect that occurs because people now expect to live 
longer, so lifecycle income must be spread over a longer life.
23  From the lifecycle budget 
constraint these adjustments must satisfy: 
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 Then using the definition of  ( ) z s :  
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If reductions in mortality from ailment B are weighted toward periods where net saving is positive, 
then consumption rises (marginal utility falls) and complementarity in (19) is assured.  But if 
progress against B occurs mainly in periods of negative net saving the marginal utility of 
consumption must rise.  For recent medical advances such as reductions in mortality from 
cardiovascular disease – which mainly strikes older, non-working individuals – lower per-period 
consumption is likely because savings must finance a longer retirement when mortality falls.
24  
Even so, for reasonable values of the parameters and empirically relevant savings rates this term is 
negligible.  Then (19) is positive and we conclude that mortality-reducing improvements in health 
are complementary. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
22 To focus on essential ideas, we rule out the obvious case where progress against one disease, say A, affects 
mortality from B.  
23 Absent saving, so y=c in all periods, this term does not appear and complementarity is assured. 
24 We ignore other indirect effects that would reinforce complementarity by increasing y(t), such as delayed retirement 
or increased investment in human capital.   24 
  The next case we consider is when ailment A affects mortality (e.g. cancer) but B affects 
the quality of life through type-H health (e.g. Alzheimer’s).  Does progress against cancer raise the 
value of progress against Alzheimer’s?  As utility takes the form Hu(z), we have ruled out the 
obvious case where willingness to pay depends directly on H.
25  Instead the effect is channeled 
though the complementarity of H with z: a medical advance that raises H at older ages, for 
example, causes a reallocation of lifecycle consumption, raising consumer surplus at older ages as 
well.   This is complementary with reductions in mortality, which raise the probability of being 
alive at older ages.  Formally, the displacement of the budget constraint when  0 db >  yields  
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 at all ages because the consumption 
profile is unchanged.  But if proportional changes in H are larger at older ages, such as for 
progress against diseases like Alzheimer’s or arthritis, then 





is negative at young 
ages and positive at older ones.  This fact is useful in evaluating complementarity in willingness to 
pay, determined by 
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 is constant, then since 
( , ) t a a G  is non-decreasing the sign of (22) is determined by whether improvements in H  rise or 
                                                            
25 That is, we have ruled out the case where an increase in H has a larger impact on utility than on the marginal utility 
of consumption.  In that case, progress against Alzheimer’s (for example) would raise the value of a life year among   25 
fall with age.  The expression is positive if 




 rises with age, because then  ( , ) t a a G  gives 
greater weight to positive values of 





.   This means that mortality-reducing 
medical advances are complementary with type-H health improvements that increase with age.  
Advances against heart disease raise willingness to pay for progress against Alzheimer’s and 
arthritis, and so on.   
  The last case to consider is when afflictions A and B both affect type-H health, but not 
mortality.  Then complementarity is determined by the sign of  
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 constant, comparison with (21) indicates that  0 Vab >  when 





largest weight at ages when 




 is large.  So age-increasing advances (e.g. against arthritis 
and Alzheimer’s) tend to be complements, as are age-decreasing ones (e.g. against non-fatal 
childhood ailments). 
This analysis has yielded three additional implications: 
6.  Mortality-reducing (type-G) improvements in health tend to be complementary: reductions in 
mortality from one disease raise the value of progress against other life-threatening ailments.  
Progress against heart disease raises the value of progress against cancer. 
7.  Mortality reducing improvements in health raise the value of type-H improvements that 
increase with age.  Reductions in mortality from heart disease raise the value of progress 
against Alzheimer’s or arthritis. 
8.  Type-H improvements in health that increase with age are complementary with one another.  
Progress against Alzheimer’s raises the value of progress against arthritis. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
the elderly, reinforcing complementarity with other advances that reduce mortality.   26 
 
 
The Social Value of Improvements in Health  
The framework set out above values health improvements by measuring willingness to pay 
for a representative individual.  An important application of our method is in assessing the value 
of medical advances or improvements in public health infrastructure that increase society’s 
“output” of health.  These advances typically affect both current and future populations, so to 
measure the social value of such advances we must aggregate over the current and expected future 
populations that benefit.  If (15) represents an individual’s willingness to pay for health 
improvements, then the current social value of advances that improve health from datet onward 
is: 
(24)                          
0
( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) (0)
f
a
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Here N(a,t) is the population of age a at date t  and  ( )
f N t  is the present discounted value of the 
number of births in future years.  These enter the calculation because a medical advance that 
improves the health of the current population will also apply to future generations, for whom value 
is measured at birth.  When combined with (15), equation (24) yields two additional implications. 
9.  The current social value of a medical advance is proportional to the size of the current and 
future populations to which it applies. 
10. Aggregate willingness to pay for progress against a particular disease will be highest when the 
age distribution of the population is concentrated near, but before, the typical age of onset of 
the disease.  For example, the aging of the baby-boom generation has raised the social value of 
medical advances against age-related ailments.   27 
In our empirical applications we will apply (24) to mortality data in three ways.  First, treating 
reductions in mortality at any past date t as the outcome of technical improvements that increase 
health output, we will augment date-t  national income to include the value of life-years 
“produced”.   Second, we use (24) to calculate what past reductions in mortality are worth today.  
For example, we calculate the current value of reductions in mortality from heart disease that 
occurred between 1970 and 2000.  Third, we use (24) to calculate the prospective value of medical 
progress that would, say, reduce the average likelihood of dying from cancer or AIDs by some 
amount.  
VI. Estimating the Value of Past and Prospective Health Improvements 
This section applies the model of Sections III-V to measure long-term gains in the value of 
life, the disease-specific sources of those gains, and the prospective values of future progress 
against life-threatening diseases.  We also show how to account for changes in medical 
expenditures that accompany life-extending medical progress, which is a central feature of cost-
benefit analyses of improving health care.  We begin by gauging the size, timing, and age-
distribution of gains over the 20
th century. 
Valuing Longevity Gains over the 20
th Century   
Using age and gender specific mortality tables for the United States that begin in 1900, 
Figures 4a-b show the timing and age distribution of increases in the value of life over the 20
th 
century.
26  For these calculations, we value additional life-years at past dates at current willingness 
to pay, using the age profile of values shown in Figure 2a.  In other words, the figures show the 
value received by individuals of a particular age today from health-improving advances that were 
                                                            
26 Nordhaus (2003) discusses the production of health in the context of national income accounts, and concludes that 
valuing increased longevity substantially growth in welfare. Murphy and Topel (2003a) provide initial estimates for 
the 1970-98 period.   28 
achieved in the past.  Vertical differences between two curves represent the present discounted 
value of changes in survivor rates accruing to individuals of a particular age for a particular 
decade, so the top curve (2000) shows cumulative gains from 1900 to 2000, and so on.   
For both men and women the largest gains in the value of life are at birth and at young 
ages, representing large declines in infant mortality and deaths from childhood diseases.  We 
estimate that health improvements from all sources and at all ages over the 20
th century yielded 
additional life years for a new born male or female with a present discounted value of nearly $2 
million.  Most of the gains for newborns occurred in the early decades of the century – more than 
half occurred by 1930 and more than 80 percent had been realized by 1950, reflecting substantial 
progress against infant and childhood mortality in the first half of the century.  But gains are also 
very substantial for adults. Men aged 20 to 40 gained additional life-years worth roughly $1 
million, valued at current implicit prices.  Women’s gains in these “prime” years were even larger, 
peaking at nearly $1.2 million for women in their early 30s.  This reflects the fact that expected 
remaining durations of life increased by more for women than for men, as we value life years for 
men and women at the same implicit prices.  Importantly for what follows, Figures 4a-b show 
negligible progress for women after 1980, though men enjoyed substantial gains over this period. 
Even among adults, the gains by age were unevenly distributed over the century.  Roughly 
three-fourths of the $1 million gain enjoyed by 20 year old men had occurred by 1960, but the 
corresponding proportion for 40 year olds is about half and among 60 year olds it is substantially 
less than half.  In other words, progress during the first half of the 20
th century disproportionately 
benefited the young, but progress at the end of the century shifted toward older individuals, 
reflecting (as we shall see) progress against heart disease, stroke, and other older-age ailments.        29 
To evaluate whether these estimates are reasonable, consider the $1 million gain enjoyed 
by a 30 year old male.  Over the century, the expected remaining duration of life for 30 year old 
men increased by 11.3 years, from 34.9 to 46.2.  So think of a current 30 year old male who is 
offered the choice of (a) his current standard of living and health or (b) a lump sum of $1 million 
and the life-expectancy of 30 year old in 1900, which is 11.3 years shorter.  Our estimates imply 
that the choice is a close call, but for a payment of less than $1 million he would keep his current 
health.  For women, the corresponding gain in life expectancy is 14.9 years, from 36.4 to 50.5, 
which is worth nearly $1.2 million.  If the reader thinks that it would take greater payments than 
these to induce a trade, then our estimates are conservative. 
Figure 5 further documents the difference in timing between men’s and women’s 
cumulative gains.  We graph age-weighted average gains for men and women over the entire 
century, using end-of-century population weights.  These gains cumulate to about $1.3 million for 
the representative individual of each sex.  Notice that women’s gains started to outpace men’s in 
the 1930s and that progress for both men and women decelerated in the early 1950s, reflecting the 
near-exhaustion of potential progress against infant and child mortality.  For men, health progress 
stalled for 20 years, so that the female-male gap in attained value gained reached nearly $180,000 
by 1970.  But male progress resumed after 1970, reflecting advances against adult ailments (see 
Figure 4), and the female-male disparity had vanished by the end of the century.
27 
The estimates in Figures 4a-b value past gains at current willingness to pay, so they 
represent the current value of past progress—what people alive today gained from earlier 
improvements.  Another way to illustrate the importance of health progress is to value mortality-
reducing progress using willingness to pay at the date it occurs, so newly “produced” life years are 
                                                            
27 Murphy and Topel (2003b) apply these methods to disparities in health progress by race and gender, showing 
convergence in the value of health outcomes for blacks relative to whites.   30 
a component of output—health capital—that is uncounted in national income accounts.
28  The 
result is a sort of “health augmented” measure of per-capita national output that counts the present 
value of reduced mortality at the date it is observed.  Table 4 reports the results of this exercise. 
From 1900 to 1950 the average per-capita value of new life-years “produced” through 
declining mortality was roughly equal to average output of goods and services.  The decade from 
1910-20 is an exception, reflecting the impact of the flu pandemic of 1917-19.  Gains after 1950 
form a smaller share of “output” per person because other forms of productivity have grown faster.  
Taking account of health capital in this way also changes one’s perspective on relative growth 
rates from different decades: per-capita GDP grew rapidly during the 1960s and slowly during the 
1970s, yet production of this measure of health stagnated in the 1960s—it was lower than at any 
other time during the century—but boomed in the 1970s.   
Post-1970 Gains 
Figures 4 and 5 showed a resumption of mortality-reducing health progress after 1970, 
which was concentrated at older ages and greater for men than for women.  We now turn to a more 
detailed examination of this episode.  
Figures 6a-b show the timing and age-distribution of gains after 1970.  In contrast to the 
century-long gains shown above, the largest gains after 1970 accrue to persons between ages 40 
and 60, reflecting progress against ailments that affect older individuals.  Cumulative gains for 
men peak at over $460,000 for 50 year olds (who gained about 5 years of life-expectancy), which 
is about double the peak gains of women (who gained 2.8 years).  Most of this value, and most of 
the difference between the gains of men and women, is due to substantial progress against heart 
                                                            
28 To measure willingness to pay in each period we maintain the shape of v(t) in 2000, but rescale its level according 
to the ratio of GDP per capita in year ￿ and in 2000.  We (necessarily) count reductions in mortality when they are 
observed, which may not correspond to when they are produced.  For example, if improved neo-natal care reduces the 
likelihood of heart attacks at age 50, we will badly miss the timing of health production.   31 
disease alone (Figure 7), which kills more men, at earlier ages, than women.  Reduced mortality 
from heart disease over this 30-year interval was worth nearly $300,000 to a 50 year old male 
(Figure 8), which was roughly three-fourths of the overall increase in the value of remaining life. 
This partially accounts for the late-century “convergence” of men’s and women’s gains, due to a 
sharp deceleration in women’s progress after 1980 (Figure 6b).  This fact will prove important 
below, when we deduct rising expenditures for medical care from these values. 
Table 5 reports the social value of these advances, using (24) to aggregate private values 
over end-of-century and expected future populations. So, for example, the 1970-80 gain of 
$188,706 for 45-54 year old men represents what men of that age in 2000 would be willing to pay 
to have 1980 survival rates instead of 1970 survival rates.  This gain applies to a population of 
15.8 million men, and so on.  The population at birth represents the present discounted value (at 
3.5%) of projected birth cohorts, as estimated by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
29 
The numbers are huge because the population to which per-person gains are applied is 
large.  For men, mortality reductions that were achieved between 1970 and 1980 have an 
aggregate present discounted value of $27 trillion.  Progress slowed somewhat after 1980, but 
even so the cumulative post-1970 gains for men total $61 trillion.  Women’s gains, which total 
“only” $34 trillion over the full period, decline sharply relative to men’s after 1980.  Combining 
men’s and women’s gains, reductions in mortality between 1970 and 2000 yielded additional life-
years with an end-of-century value of $95 trillion, or about $3.2 trillion per year.  Of this amount, 
separate calculations show that about two-thirds ($64 trillion) accrued to persons alive in 2000, 
and one-third will be enjoyed by future birth cohorts. 
 
   32 
Net Gains: Deducting the Rising Costs of Medical Care 
  To be economically worthwhile the benefits of health improvements must offset the costs 
of achieving them.  These costs have two basic components.  The first is the up-front cost of 
developing new health-improving technologies or infrastructure, which takes the form of medical 
research and development expenditures, broadly defined.  The second is the cost of actually 
implementing new procedures and treatments, which is a flow of direct health care expenditures.  
These costs can either rise or fall as a consequence of technical advances, depending on the nature 
of the advance and the nature of demand for medical services. 
  Health expenditures can be accounted for by a straightforward extension of the earlier 
analysis.  We assume that health expenditures at age t, k(t), provide no direct utility beyond their 
necessity for maintaining health.  Then a health-improving technical advance ( 0 da > ) may 
improve both longevity and the quality of life while also changing the costs of health care.  
Willingness to pay for such an advance is a simple extension of (15): 
(25)    
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In (25)  ( ) k t a  is the change in health spending at age t.  If health spending is chosen efficiently 
then terms involving  ( ) k t a  vanish because the net return to a marginal increase in expenditure is 
zero.  Then the balance of benefits and costs is surely positive and (25) is equivalent to (15).  But 
the presence of third-party payers for medical services can distort these decisions, so the true 
benefits of medical advances can be smaller than the costs of supplying them.  This can be 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
29 http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/ , Table 2A.   33 
important on certain margins, as when large medical costs are incurred very near the end of life, 
allegedly to little benefit.   
Our empirical analogue of (25) compares the value of increased longevity to changes 
health expenditures, broken out by gender and age.  We use data on individuals’ expenditures 
from the Medical Expenditure Surveys, collected in 1977, 1987, and then as a panel starting in 
1996.  As is the case with virtually all survey estimates of household consumption, survey-
predicted aggregate medical spending underestimates actual national expenditure for medical 
services.  So we use the age profile of relative spending from the survey data to allocate total 
medical expenditures. This procedure gives us estimates of aggregate health care expenditure by 
age and gender from 1970 to 2000.
30 
Table 6 shows that medical expenditures grew from 11.3% of total consumption in 1970 to 
19.6% in 2000.  Adjusting real per-capita expenditures for the changing age composition of the 
population, per-person expenditure on medical services grew from $2171 in 1970 to $4855 in 
2000, or by 124%.  Calculating the present value of aggregate medical expenditures using 2000 
population weights and survival probabilities, and assuming that the same level of expenditure 
applies to future years and birth cohorts, the capital value of medical expenditures grew from 
$16.2 trillion in 1970 to over $50 trillion by 2000. 
Table 7 calculates net social gains from increased longevity by combining the estimates 
from Tables 5 and 6.  It is important to note that this method of allocating benefits and costs is 
only a rough analogue of equation (25).  In (25),  ( ) k t a  represents the change in medical 
expenditures that are the direct consequence of implementing a new medical technology. We 
                                                            
30 If the understatement varies by age, then our allocations will be biased.  Based on data from national health care 
systems in Canada and the UK, the age profile of expenditures in the MES and MEPS is flatter than in these systems, 
suggesting that we might understate spending at older ages.  However, MES and MEPS projections account for about   34 
actually measure the value of increased longevity and changes in medical expenditures from all 
sources.  This may cause us to either overestimate or underestimate the true social value of health 
care advances.  First, changes in medical expenditures include expenditures that raise the “quality” 
of life ( ( ) 0 H t a > ), which we ignore, so we may underestimate true social gains.  Second, some 
current medical expenditures are investments in health that produce future benefits, so costs 
incurred in one period may yield measurable benefits later.  Expenditures during our period of 
study may yield future benefits, leading to an underestimate of net gains, or benefits that we 
observe may be the outcome of past events, which causes an overestimate.  Finally, some observed 
gains may be due to things unrelated to direct medical spending—cleaner air or water, for 
example. We don’t count the costs of these things.   
With these caveats in mind, Table 7 shows our estimates of “net” social gains.  Between 
1970 and 2000 increased longevity yielded a “gross” social value of $95 trillion, while the 
capitalized value of medical expenditures grew by $34 trillion, leaving a net gain of $61 trillion—
still large by any standard.  Almost two thirds ($39 trillion) of this gain “occurs” in the 1970s, 
where both gross benefits are highest and additional costs are lowest.  Overall, rising medical 
expenditures absorb only 36% of the value of increased longevity. 
The estimates in Table 7 represent a sort of “average” gain over the population as a whole.  
Yet many critiques of the efficacy of rising medical expenditures focus on marginal decisions to 
expend resources when benefits are smaller than costs (e.g., Meltzer, 2003; Fuchs, 1972), 
especially on life-extending procedures for individuals who are near death.
31  Table 8 provides 
some evidence on how our estimates of average net gains vary with age.  For men, net gains are 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
62 percent of total medical spending but 68 percent of actual Medicare expenditures, for which virtually all Americans 
over age 65 qualify.  These data suggest that the actual age profile of medical spending is flatter in the US. 
31 For example, over a quarter of all Medicare expenditures are spent in the last year of life, a proportion that has 
remained remarkably stable since the 1970s.  See Hogan, Lunney, Gabel, and Lynn (2001).   35 
positive overall and in each sub-period for all but the oldest (85+) age category.  Incremental cost 
as a proportion of gross benefits is fairly constant until we reach older age categories (65 and 
older), when the cost share rises sharply.  The story is different for women, however. Women’s 
incremental costs are a larger proportion of benefits in every age group, and we estimate negative 
average net benefits for women over age 65.  In the 1990s we estimate average net losses for 
women in every age group except infants, and the size of deficits rises sharply with age.  Though 
these expenditures may surely be offset by uncounted improvements in the quality of life, they 
provide a cautionary tale that even large values may be swamped by increased costs. 
What’s on the Table?  Prospective Gains from Medical Progress 
We now turn to estimates of what can be gained from future progress against particular 
mortality-causing diseases.  Our calculations make no attempt to deduct prospective costs of such 
progress, so they should be interpreted as the value of life-years that could be gained from a given 
reduction in mortality from a disease.  This value must be large enough to cover the costs of 
developing and implementing new medical advances that would save lives.   
Our benchmark is a 10 percent reduction in mortality from a life-threatening disease; this or 
even greater progress seems within the realm of possibility.  Figures 9a and 9b show our estimates 
of the age profiles of individual values resulting from a 10 percent reduction in mortality from five 
major causes of death.  For both men and women the largest potential values are for 
cardiovascular diseases, with peak gains occurring in late middle age of  nearly $35,000 per 
person for men and $28,000 for women.  Potential gains from progress against cancer are nearly as 
large, with a noteworthy 20-year earlier peak for women that reflects the incidence of breast 
cancer.  Progress against infectious diseases—of which mortality from AIDS accounts for about a   36 
third—has far lower average value because of much lower incidence, and it peaks earlier 
reflecting the typical age of onset.  
The profiles in Figures 9a-b give values of progress at different ages.  To get the current social 
value of such progress we aggregate over the age distribution of the 2000 U.S. population and add 
the present value of gains measured at birth for forecasted future birth cohorts, as in (25).  These 
social values are shown in Table 9.  A 10 percent reduction in all-cause mortality would have a 
present discounted social value of $18.5 trillion.  About 30 percent of this total ($5.7 trillion) is 
due to potential progress against cardiovascular diseases, where much progress has already been 
made.  Similar progress against cancer would be worth $4.7 trillion, with roughly equal benefits 
for men and women.  A ten percent reduction in mortality from infectious diseases, including 
AIDS, is of roughly the same value to men ($500 billion) that progress against breast cancer 
would be for women ($444 billion).  For women, mortality-reducing progress against heart disease 
is four times more valuable than equivalent progress against breast cancer. 
To put these values in perspective, total federal support for health related research in the 
United States for fiscal 2005 is about $28 billion.  If we capitalize this expenditure over the 
indefinite future at 3 percent interest, it is roughly equal to the $1 trillion value of a one percent 
reduction in mortality from cancer and cardiovascular disease.  Even if we offset these gains by 
substantial increases in the cost of the treatments required to implement potential new 
technologies, potential net gains would still be very large. 
Our discussion of equation (19) indicated that forms of health progress are complementary—
reductions in mortality from any source raise the value of further progress.  The right hand column 
of Table 9 illustrates the importance of this effect by calculating the impact of 1970-2000 health 
progress on the prospective values from Panel A.  The estimates show the increase in the current   37 
social value of future progress against each disease that is due to the decline in mortality between 
1970 and 2000.  Formally we calculate: 
(26)           
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The social value of health complementarity has two components.  The first is how much more 
today’s population (
1 N ) will pay for future progress when that value is based on current survival 
rates (denoted 
1 Va ) than on past ones (
0 Va ).  The second component reflects the fact that today’s 
population (
1 N ) is larger than had people lived their lives under mortality rates from 1970 (
0 N ).   
Overall, we find that declining mortality between 1970 and 2000 raised the social value of 
future health progress by 18 percent, or by $3.3 trillion for our benchmark case of a 10 percent 
reduction in death rates.  Two-thirds of this effect ($2.2 trillion) is due to increased willingness to 
pay for progress against heart disease and cancer.  This illustrates that the value of health progress 
will continue to rise simply because people are getting healthier, even in the absence of growing 
productivity and incomes.  Economic growth and income-elastic willingness to pay for health 
progress will only reinforce this effect. 
Notice that the share of value attributed to complementarity is larger for diseases whose 
incidence increases with age.   This is implied by equation (19) because reductions in mortality 
between 1970 and 2000 have mainly occurred at older ages, which has a stronger impact in raising 
the value of progress against age-related causes of mortality. 
Changes in the Quality of Life 
All of our calculations to this point have placed a value on actual and prospective changes 
in the quantity of life (longevity), ignoring possible gains in the quality of life through 
improvements in type-H health.  This is simply because changes in mortality are directly   38 
measurable, while changes in the quality of life are not.  Though we have no direct measure of 
these improvements, we think it’s important to provide at least a ballpark estimate of how valuable 
these gains might be.   
As a rough approximation we assume that advances in longevity and quality of life are 
related.  Let  0( ) t l  and  1( ) t l  denote mortality rates at age t in 1970 and 2000, respectively.  Since 
mortality rates declined, we assume that if  1 0 ( ) ( ) t t k l l = -  then persons of age t in 2000 are k 
years “younger” than were similarly aged people in 1970.  We then assign 
( )/ ( ) ln ( ) ln ( ) H t H t H t k H t ¢ = - -  based on the H-profile in Figure 2b, and we calculate the 
second term of (15): 
(28)                                  
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Figure 10 shows estimates of the value of post-1970 changes in type-H health based on this 
procedure.  Peak valuations are big: roughly $1.2 million for men and $820,000 for women in 
their late-40s.  The values are large because the data indicate that men in this age range were about 
6 years “younger” in 2000 than they were in 1970—a 55 year old in 2000 is equivalent to a 49 
year old from 1970—and our estimate of H(t) is steeply declining.  These estimates are roughly 
triple the peak values from increased longevity over the period, shown in Figures 6a-b, which 
suggests that improvements in quality of life may be the more valuable dimension of recent health 
advances.       
VII. Conclusions 
  We have developed a framework for valuing improvements in health, based on willingness 
to pay, and used this framework to estimate the value of past and prospective future health 
advances.  The resulting values are large by any standard.  Reductions in mortality from 1970 to   39 
2000 had an (uncounted) economic value to the 2000 population of the U.S. of about $3.2 trillion 
per year.  Over the longer term, cumulative longevity gains during the 20
th century were worth 
about $1.3 million per person to the representative member of the 2000 U.S. population.  Valued 
at the date they occurred, the production of longevity-related “health capital” would raise 
estimates of per-capita output in the U.S. by from 10 to 50 percent, depending on the time period 
in question.    
Prospectively, even modest progress against mortality causing diseases such as cancer and 
heart disease would have enormous social values.  A one percent reduction in mortality from 
cancer or heart disease would be worth nearly $500 billion to current and future Americans.  
These estimates ignore the value of health advances to individuals in other countries, so they 
likely understate aggregate social values of possible innovations.  They also ignore corresponding 
improvements in the quality of life—which evidence suggests may be even more valuable than 
gains in longevity—and for these reasons as well they are likely to be conservative.  We show that 
these values will increase in the future because of economic growth and, more interestingly, 
because health itself continues to improve.  
Large as they are, these values may be offset by the costs of developing and implementing 
improvements in health.  Current public and private spending on health-related research is a tiny 
fraction of what is on the table, yet such investments may not be worthwhile if the costs of 
implementing new technologies is large.  Social transfer programs and other third-party methods 
of financing health care can distort both utilization decisions and research, with the result that 
some health improvements are socially inefficient. 
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Source: National Vital Statistics Reports, vol 52, #14, February 18, 2004, Table 12. 
Female at birth 
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Table 1 
Age Distribution of Increasing Longevity, by Decade, 1900-2000 




Interval  1900-1910 1910-1920 1920-1930 1930-1940 1940-1950 1950-1960 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 
 
Total 
<1  1.90  2.48  1.63  0.97  1.66  0.54  0.36  0.75  0.23  0.19  10.71 
1-14  1.51  1.00  1.37  1.04  0.65  0.17  0.10  0.13  0.10  0.09  6.16 
15-34  0.68  0.16  0.96  0.99  0.71  0.18  -0.27  0.18  0.09  0.38  4.06 
35-54  0.18  0.71  0.02  0.55  0.76  0.30  -0.02  0.67  0.32  0.37  3.87 
55-74  0.02  0.45  -0.21  0.09  0.49  0.10  0.05  1.00  0.82  1.01  3.83 
75+  0.02  0.05  0.05  -0.03  0.31  0.05  0.16  0.18  0.28  0.57  1.61 
 




Interval  1900-1910 1910-1920 1920-1930 1930-1940 1940-1950 1950-1960 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 
 
Total 
<1  1.65  2.22  1.28  0.88  1.39  0.40  0.35  0.59  0.22  0.16  9.12 
1-14  1.67  1.02  1.47  0.99  0.62  0.15  0.10  0.11  0.07  0.06  6.26 
15-34  1.11  -0.57  1.62  1.24  1.00  0.30  -0.01  0.16  0.06  0.08  4.99 
35-54  0.66  0.03  0.63  0.83  1.01  0.48  0.02  0.56  0.28  0.05  4.56 
55-74  0.20  0.17  0.29  0.62  1.20  0.70  0.43  0.71  0.29  0.36  4.97 
75+  0.02  0.02  0.16  0.03  0.66  0.23  0.73  0.80  0.34  0.09  3.07 
 
Total  5.31  2.89  5.46  4.59  5.87  2.25  1.61  2.94  1.25  0.79  32.97 
Notes:  Figures are additional expected life-years calculated from cross sectional age-specific mortality rates in each year.  Entries for each age interval are 
contributions to additional expected life years over the decade due to changes in mortality rates in that age interval.  Source: Authors’ calculations from Center 
for Disease Control, Vital Statistics, Special Reports, various years.   45 
Table 2 
Additional Life Years Due to Reduced Mortality 







Disease  1950-60  1960-70  1970-80  1980-90  1990-00  Total 
 
Infant Mortality  0.54  0.36  0.75  0.23  0.20  2.07 
 
Heart Disease  0.16  0.38  1.05  1.26  0.88  3.73 
 
Cancer  -0.19  -0.17  -0.08  0.02  0.43  0.01 
 
Stroke  0.10  0.15  0.41  0.24  0.08  0.98 
 
Accidents  0.18  -0.15  0.37  0.41  0.17  0.98 
 
Other  0.54  -0.19  0.41  -0.31  0.85  1.30 
 
Total  1.33  0.37  2.92  1.85  2.60  9.07 
Disease  1950-60  1960-70  1970-80  1980-90  1990-00  Total 
 
Infant Mortality  0.40  0.35  0.59  0.22  0.13  1.68 
 
Heart Disease  0.59  0.72  0.87  0.90  0.46  3.54 
 
Cancer  0.20  0.07  -0.01  -0.11  0.17  0.31 
 
Stroke  0.20  0.33  0.63  0.38  0.06  1.59 
 
Accidents  0.10  -0.04  0.17  0.13  0.01  0.36 
 
Other  0.77  0.19  0.69  -0.25  -0.04  1.36 
 
Total  2.25  1.61  2.94  1.25  0.79  8.85 
 
Notes:  Figures are additional expected life-years calculated from cross sectional age-specific 
mortality rates in each year.  Entries for each cause of death are contributions to additional expected 
life years over the decade due to changes in mortality rates from that cause.  Source: Authors’ 
calculations from Center for Disease Control, Vital Statistics, Special Reports, various years.   46 
Table 3 
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Note:  The table assumes a value of full consumption of  $120,000
F F y c = =  for a 50 year-old male with 
4000 total available hours per year and wage of $30/hour, including benefits.     
 
 




Notes: See text for discussion of methods.  Valuations assume $6.3 million average value of a statistical life, 
earnings of $60,000 at age 50, and peak consumption at age 50.  Health profile is estimated residually from 









Notes:  See equation (14).  Estimates are based on v(t) from Figure 2a, assuming an average value of a statistical 
life of $6.3 million between ages 25 and 55. Valuations of a life year are assumed identical for men and women. 
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Notes:  Each curve shows the cumulative value of increased longevity since 1900.  Distance between curves 





Notes:  Each curve represents the cumulative value to the indicated year due to increased longevity since 1900, as 
valued by persons in 2000.  Age specific values are averaged using 2000 population weights. 








Decade Averages of GDP and Production of Health Capital per Capita 
1900-2000 ($2004) 
   
  1900-10  1910-20  1920-30  1930-40  1940-50  1950-60  1960-70  1970-80  1980-90  1990-
2000 
GDP  $6,011  $7,239  $7,703  $7,578  $13,592  $15,856  $20,343  $25,342  $28,381  $32,057 
                     
Health 
Capital 
$4,987  $2,754  $5,513  $6,062  $12,314  $4,951  $2,381  $12,839  $7,305  $8,240 
                     
Total   $10,998  $9,993  $13,216  $13,640  $25,906  $20,807  $22,724  $38,181  $35,685  $40,297 




0.45  0.28  0.42  0.44  0.48  0.24  0.10  0.34  0.20  0.20 
 
Source:  Average annual real ($2004) amounts.  Author’s calculations for health capital.  GDP before 1929 from Kuznets (1961) as compiled by Jones and 
Obstfeld (2001), downloaded from NBER website.  Post-1929 data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Pre-1913 price index 















Notes:  Each curve shows the cumulative value of increased longevity since 1970.  Distance between curves 
represents gains in each decade.   
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Source:  Health, United State 2001, Death Rates for Diseases of Heart (Table 37).  
    
 
Notes:  See equation (15).  Value to person of the indicated age in 2000 of reduced mortality from that age 
forward, 1970-2000.   54 
Table 5 
Economic Gains From Reductions in Mortality: 1970-2000 
             
  Population  Gains Per Capita ($2004)   
Males  (1000)  1970-1980  1980-1990  1990-2000  1970-2000   
Birth  72,134  $129,381  $62,904  $80,536  $272,821   
1to4  7,938  $77,707  $44,446  $67,747  $189,900   
5to14  19,681  $92,564  $50,912  $81,699  $225,175   
15to24  18,618  $118,310  $60,553  $103,061  $281,925   
25to34  20,191  $155,129  $76,181  $114,201  $345,511   
35to44  21,569  $186,015  $114,368  $119,097  $419,481   
45to54  15,836  $188,706  $142,098  $130,001  $460,805   
55to64  10,166  $160,057  $123,566  $128,891  $412,514   
65to74  8,325  $96,938  $87,575  $90,695  $275,207   
75to84  4,486  $37,124  $43,542  $56,356  $137,022   
85+  1,070  -$8,112  $14,405  $25,764  $32,057   
             
Females    1970-1980  1980-1990  1990-2000  1970-2000   
Birth  68,773  $99,375  $43,392  $27,808  $170,575   
1to4  7,578  $59,139  $26,859  $15,649  $101,647   
5to14  18,741  $69,415  $30,220  $16,407  $116,042   
15to24  17,604  $90,711  $37,422  $19,168  $147,301   
25to34  20,177  $115,916  $48,058  $21,755  $185,729   
35to44  21,824  $131,014  $60,700  $27,032  $218,746   
45to54  16,533  $130,033  $61,701  $34,326  $226,061   
55to64  11,195  $122,529  $51,496  $23,018  $197,043   
65to74  10,345  $106,297  $48,121  -$47  $154,370   
75to84  6,944  $66,766  $33,786  -$8,995  $91,558   
85+  2,692  $19,385  $11,524  -$10,213  $20,696   
             
             Aggregate Gains (Billions of $2004) 
    1970-1980  1980-1990  1990-20  1970-2000   
  Males  $26,699  $15,471  $19,153  $61,323   
  Females  $20,515  $9,067  $4,440  $34,022   
  Total  $47,214  $24,538  $23,593  $95,345   
 
 
Notes:  Aggregate gains calculated using equation (24) and year 2000 U.S. population by age, as shown.  
Population at birth includes Census-predicted future birth cohorts discounted at 3.5 percent.  55 
 
Table 6 
U.S. Health Expenditures 1970-2000 
             
      1970  1980  1990  2000 
             
Nominal Expenditures ($Billions)  $73  $246  $696  $1,311 
% of Total Consumption Expenditures  11.3%  13.9%  18.2%  19.6% 
             
Real Expenditures ($Billions 2004)         
    Current Year Population    $261  $445  $812  $1,221 
    Fixed Population    $369  $548  $883  $1,143 
             
Per Capita Expenditures ($2004)         
    Current Year Population    $1,537  $2,354  $3,911  $5,187 
    Fixed Population    $2,171  $2,897  $4,249  $4,855 
             
Present Value of Total Expenditures  $16,209  $24,414  $39,342  $50,933 
($Billions 2004, Fixed Population)         
 
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary: National Health Statistics Group.  “Fixed 







Estimated Gains Net of the Increase in Health Expenditures 
1970-2000 
             
      1970-1980  1980-1990  1990-2000  1970-2000 
Gross Gains (from Table 5)  $47,214  $24,538  $23,593  $95,345 
Increase in Expenditures    $8,206  $14,928  $11,591  $34,725 
Gains Net of Expenditure Growth  $39,008  $9,611  $12,001  $60,620 
Expenditure Increase as a % of Gains  17.4%  60.8%  49.1%  36.4% 
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Table 8 
 Economic Gains From Reductions in Mortality 
Net of Increased Health Care Expenditure, 1970-2000 
             
Males  Population  1970-1980  1980-1990  1990-2000  1970-2000  Cost/Value 
             
Birth  72,134  $119,958  $38,551  $61,967  $220,477  19.2% 
1to4  7,938  $68,373  $20,716  $49,657  $138,746  26.9% 
5to14  19,681  $81,703  $23,746  $60,995  $166,444  26.1% 
15to24  18,618  $105,116  $28,576  $78,704  $212,396  24.7% 
25to34  20,191  $139,412  $39,890  $86,580  $265,882  23.0% 
35to44  21,569  $167,199  $73,290  $87,865  $328,354  21.7% 
45to54  15,836  $166,351  $97,230  $95,943  $359,524  22.0% 
55to64  10,166  $133,497  $78,043  $94,456  $305,996  25.8% 
65to74  8,325  $69,395  $46,002  $59,350  $174,747  36.5% 
75to84  4,486  $16,138  $11,866  $32,473  $60,477  55.9% 
85+  1,070  -$21,094  -$5,191  $10,989  -$15,296  147.7% 
             
Females  Population  1970-1980  1980-1990  1990-2000  1970-2000  Cost/Value 
             
Birth  68,773  $83,703  $14,249  $4,743  $102,695  39.8% 
1to4  7,578  $43,537  -$1,779  -$7,009  $34,749  65.8% 
5to14  18,741  $51,176  -$2,832  -$9,736  $38,608  66.7% 
15to24  17,604  $68,355  -$2,117  -$12,086  $54,153  63.2% 
25to34  20,177  $88,985  $2,131  -$14,513  $76,603  58.8% 
35to44  21,824  $98,440  $7,395  -$15,017  $90,818  58.5% 
45to54  16,533  $90,914  $1,438  -$13,128  $79,224  65.0% 
55to64  11,195  $75,543  -$13,315  -$27,842  $34,386  82.5% 
65to74  10,345  $54,837  -$17,060  -$51,047  -$13,269  108.6% 
75to84  6,944  $20,825  -$24,405  -$54,526  -$58,107  163.5% 
85+  2,692  -$17,106  -$34,698  -$46,378  -$98,182  574.4% 
 





Notes: Curves show value at indicated age of a 10% reduction in mortality from the indicated disease, using 




Current Value of a 10 Percent Reduction in Mortality from Major Diseases 
(Billions of $2004) 
           
Major Cause of Death  Males  Females  Total  Complementarity 
Effect 
        Value  Share 
All Causes   $10,651  $7,885  $18,536  $3,278  0.18 
           
Cardiovascular Diseases    $3,254  $2,471  $5,725  $1,288  0.22 
Heart Disease  $2,676  $1,852  $4,529  $1,013  0.22 
Cerebrovascular Diseases  $393  $460  $852  $194  0.23 
           
Malignant Neoplasms   $2,415  $2,261  $4,675  $863  0.18 
Respiratory & Intrathoracic  $847  $557  $1,404  $278  0.20 
Breast  $3  $444  $447  $51  0.11 
Genital & Urinary  $301  $302  $603  $126  0.21 
Digestive Organs  $575  $431  $1,006  $200  0.20 
           
All Other Infectious Diseases  $500  $148  $649  $60  0.09 
           
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease  $343  $331  $674  $153  0.23 
           
Pneumonia & Influenza   $214  $194  $408  $98  0.24 
           
Diabetes   $237  $249  $486  $91  0.19 
           
Liver Disease & Cirrhosis   $217  $102  $319  $46  0.14 
           
Accidents & Adverse Effects  $977  $421  $1,398  $133  0.10 
           
Motor Vehicle Accidents   $519  $247  $767  $62  0.08 
           
Homicide & Legal Intervention   $324  $90  $415  $29  0.07 
           
Suicide  $411  $102  $513  $50  0.10 
 
Notes: Social value of a 10% reduction in mortality from the indicated disease, calculated using equation (24).  
Calculations use 2000 population values and Census predictions of future birth cohorts, discounted at 3.5%. 
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Figure 10 





Notes: Value at each age of type-H health improvements between 1970 and 2000, using equation (28).  
Calculations assume age groups with identical mortality rates in 1970 and 2000 have identical type-H health. 
 
 